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I. Introduction 
I am not a fan of sports references in legal analysis. Whether it is a 
"slam-dunk" issue or a "three-strikes" law, I fear the ease of such 
metaphors obscures principled analysis. 1 Why is the issue "slam-dunk?" 
The law is clear? The facts indisputable? Why three strikes and not six? 
What if, instead of baseball, we designed a criminal penalty based on 
overtime in football? Would we say "sudden death" is the solution for 
persistent offenders rather than three strikes? Perhaps you can begin to 
see the problem here. Of course, a lack of reasoned legal analysis is not 
contingent on a sports reference. Shorthand thinking can exist even 
without shorthand expressions, sports or otherwise. The "harmless 
error" doctrine, however, has the dubious distinction of both lacking a 
• Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, and undying fan of 
the Sacramento Monarchs and Kings. The author thanks her colleagues, Professors Joshua Dressler, 
John Sims, and Hether Macfarlane, and research assistant, Clifford Safranski, for their collective 
sports and legal knowledge. Any views and errors are personal, of course, and not the team's. 
1. With only a moderate apology to my colleague, Professor John Sims, (who was kind 
enough to read this anicle, but brazen enough to suggest that only his favorite sport, baseball, should 
be used as a sports reference) I will use references to various sports indiscriminately. Sports 
metaphors in legal parlance appear to shift somewhat randomly from baseball to football to 
basketball, and so will I. 
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sound analytical basis and representing an imprecise phrase. Not 
surprisingly, harmless error is also at times described in sports lingo as 
"no harm, no foul." 2 Thus, the harmless error doctrine has the 
unfortunate status of both a shorthand expression reflecting shorthand 
thinking and a sports metaphor. Moreover, I fear that the catchy sports 
phrase is accurate. Although the cases do not use the phrase, I believe 
that the courts have opted for a "no harm, no foul" 3 philosophy with 
harmless error, without fully analyzing either the "harm" or the "foul." 
By conceptualizing harmless error in a "no harm, no foul" manner, the 
courts have diminished the significance of constitutional violations and 
shifted the emphasis from the fairness of the process to the correctness of 
the result. A further byproduct of the "no harm, no foul" approach is the 
usurpation by the appellate court of the ultimate fact-finding 
responsibility, in contravention of the defendant's right to a jury trial. 
The Supreme Court's continuing misapplication of the harmless error 
doctrine as a "no harm, no foul" concept reached an even higher level of 
play in the Court's recent decision in Neder v. United States. 4 The Court 
failed to adhere to a principled analysis and instead reasoned in a 
shorthand fashion. Because "no harm, no foul" is an accurate description 
of the Court's approach and represents the inadequacy of the Court's 
2. Several authors have criticized the Court's harmless error cases as a "no harm, no foul" 
approach. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 442 (1980) ("Lawyers should pause at the proposition that government can 
violate a basic restriction upon itself and, through a court, tell the individual who was the beneficiary 
of the restriction: 'no harm-no foul."'); Erwin Chemerinsky, No Harm, No Foul, 16 CAL LAW. 27 
(Jan. 1996); Clancy DuBos, Note, Arizona v. Fulminante-No Harm, No Foul ?, 37 LOY. L. REv. 
1029 (1992). 
3. What is the origin of the phrase "no harm, no foul "? Out of fear that a law review editor 
would make me cite a source for the phrase, I began to research it. Naturally, I ran the phrase 
through Westlaw and Lexis, expecting that some thorough professor had already done this research, 
and I could simply cite to his or her article. Life was not so simple. Although there were an 
abundance of references in articles to "no harm, no foul," I could not locate a reference to the origin 
of the phrase. No famous quotations reference helped me out either. I then turned to my most 
respected colleague in criminal jurisprudence, Professor Joshua Dressler. I knew that Professor 
Dressler was close to omniscient on criminal justice issues. But, would he have the intellectual depth 
to know the source of "no harm, no foul"? I was not to be disappointed-without even a moment of 
hesitation, Professor Dressler responded, "Oh, that phrase was coined by Chick Hearn when he was 
a sportscaster for the Los Angeles Lakers in the 1960s. I remember him using the phrase and, of 
course, there are articles about Chick Hearn that refer to this phrase. " Now, why didn't I think of 
that? 
You might think that I stopped there and decided to cite Professor Dressler, which would 
satisfy any law review editor. Instead, I felt that I should go all out for a string cite on this point. 
Our incredible library staff member, Sue Welsh, began a search that resulted in finding an article on 
"Chick-isms." According to that author (and Professor Dressler), Chick Hearn indeed coined or 
adapted the phrase "no harm, no foul" for basketball. See Mike "Lew" Lamar, Chick-isms, at 
http:/www.armory/com/- lew/sports/basketball (last updated May 10, 2001); Sam Smith, Only 
Break Hearn Will Take is a Station Break, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 2000, at Sports, Pg. 2 ; Chick 
Ream-Broadcasting, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Aug. 24, 1999, at Sports, C03; Jim Carlisle, L.A. 's 
Legendary Voices: Chick's Fabulous Forum, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, May 17, 1999, at Sports, 
COl. 
4. 527 u.s. 1 (1999). 
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reasoning, the phrase will form the game-plan for a discussion of Neder 
and the harmless error doctrine in this article. 
The original concept of the harmless error doctrine was consistent 
with basic constitutional rights and designed to serve purposes of 
furthering finality and judicial efficiency. 5 Some error is so minor that 
principled judges could conclude the error is "harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt". As described in the seminal 1967 case of Chapman v. 
California, 6 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was viewed as 
synonymous with the concept that there was no "reasonable possibility 
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction." 7 As applied in Chapman, this test meant that an 
unconstitutional comment by the prosecutor on the defendants' failure to 
testify was not harmless. As the Court stated, there was a "reasonably 
strong 'circumstantial web of evidence'" against the defendants in a 
murder, robbery, and kidnap prosecution. 8 Nevertheless, the 
prosecution's commentary on the defendants' failure to explain facts, such 
as why they bought pistols shortly before the murder and why they used a 
false name at a motel shortly after the crime, was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Court could not conclude that the prosecutorial 
comments and follow-up instructions by the judge "did not contribute to 
petitioners' convictions. "9 With the emphasis on the erroneous comments 
by the prosecutor, and not on the amount of properly admitted evidence 
against the defendants, the Court was assessing the effect on the process 
before the actual trial jury. 
Since Chapman, however, the Court has molded the doctrine into a 
"no harm, no foul" approach. The problem is that the errors, or fouls, 
are underestimated and the consequence of those errors, or harm, is 
ignored. The Court has mutated the determination of harm from an 
analysis of the process into an analysis of the result. This "final score" 
approach dismisses errors when there is overwhelming evidence of the 
defendant's guilt, rather than penalizing errors that would affect the jury's 
decision regardless of the amount of evidence of guilt. The original focus 
on the actual jury's process of decision-making has devolved into 
appellate fact-finding speculation about a hypothetical jury verdict. 10 The 
5. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. 
REv. 79, 86 (1988). The authors criticize the unthinking acceptance of finality and efficiency as the 
only purposes to fulfill; they suggest that the purposes of remedying a procedural wrong and 
deterrence need to be addressed as well. /d. at 88-91, 137. 
6. 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967). 
7. /d. at 828. 
8 . /d. at 829. 
9. /d. at 828-29. 
10. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 427-32 (discussing harmless error as appellate fact-finding 
and critiquing the overwhelming evidence approach); David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can 
Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 483, 503, n.128 and accompanying text, 
535, n.226 and accompanying text (2000) (exposing the conceptual illogic of harmless error analysis 
as necessarily based on a counter factual premise that poses a hypothetical situation without error, 
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final score approach further undermines the value of the constitutional 
rights at stake by rendering most of them harmless. With "no harm" 
found so easily, the actual constitutional error is approaching a "no foul" 
status. R,emember that the fouls we are talking about are constitutional 
violations, not a clipping charge. The constitutional fouls deserve greater 
attention and the harm should not depend on an appellate assessment of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence. In its recent harmless error decision 
in Neder, the Supreme Court again demonstrated its adherence to the final 
score interpretation of the doctrine and failed to appreciate the 
significance of either the foul or the harm. The Court's decision in Neder 
is an especially egregious demonstration of the dangers of the "no harm, 
no foul" approach, in which the defendant was deprived of his right to a 
jury verdict on all elements of the crime. 
In Neder, the Court applied a harmless error analysis to the failure to 
instruct on an element of a crime. This case, more than any other in a 
series of decisions expanding the role of harmless error analysis, severs 
the doctrine from a principled mooring. Harmless error analysis depends 
upon the existence of a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the 
elements of the crime. The appellate court must assess the possibility that 
the error affected the jury's verdict. 11 If there is no verdict on an element 
of the crime, it is not possible to conclude that the error did not affect the 
verdict. In its haste to affirm a conviction, the Court used a "no harm, 
no foul" approach. Despite the absence of a jury verdict on an element 
of the crime, the Court found overwhelming evidence of the element in 
the record and viewed the final score of guilt as satisfactory. 12 Although 
there is some surface appeal to the result-oriented approach of the Court, 
the lack of a principled harmless error analysis undermines the 
constitutionally crafted structure of a criminal trial and appeal. 
The evolution of the harmless error doctrine into a "no harm, no 
foul" approach and the recent travesty in Neder are analyzed in this 
article. Part II describes the classification of constitutional errors into 
those which are reversible per se and those which are subject to harmless 
error analysis. Part III explains the reasoning of the majority and dissent 
in the Neder case. Part IV provides a critique of the refereeing skills of 
the Supreme Court in its approach to the harmless error cases. The 
which cannot be proved, and the Court's failure to grapple with the conceptual difficulties of the 
doctrine). 
11. The standard for harmless error varies depending on the stage of the post-trial proceedings. 
This article focuses on constitutional error, which is reviewed on direct appeal. On direct review, the 
issue is whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 828. In 
a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the standard is more lenient-whether the error "had substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). For an interesting 
discussion of Chapman as constitutional common law, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and 
Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1994). 
12. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999). 
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critique points out that the Court has lapsed into a final score approach to 
constitutional error in criminal cases, which is inconsistent with the 
underlying principles of our adversary system and the role of the 
appellate courts. 
II. The Development of the "No Harm, No Foul" Approach to 
Constitutional Error 
A. The Foul 
The Supreme Court has in essence defined harmless error analysis by 
categorizing errors as "minor league" fouls and "major league" fouls. 
The major league fouls are more important than minor league fouls and 
get greater coverage-in other words, they have a greater impact on the 
litigation. Minor league constitutional fouls include violations of a 
defendant's rights, such as admission of a coerced confession, 13 admission 
of a co-defendant's statement in violation of the Confrontation Clause, 14 
the use of mandatory presumptions in violation of the Due Process 
Clause, 15 admission of evidence obtained through an unconstitutional 
search or seizure, 16 and Miranda violations. 17 Major league constitutional 
fouls include conducting a trial with a biased judge or without 
representation, 18 and inaccurately instructing on the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. 19 Some fouls, just like some players, tried out for the 
major leagues, and undoubtedly have many of the traits of a major league 
foul, but were ultimately relegated to the minor leagues. These "aspiring 
fouls" include instructional error, such as misdescribing an element of the 
crime/0 and failing to instruct on an element of the crime.21 
13. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1990) (holding a coerced confession 
subject to harmless error analysis, but not harmless in the case). 
14. See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), discussed infra note 33 and 
accompanying text. 
15. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (holding that harmless error doctrine applies 
to unconstitutional presumption of malice); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (remanding 
for determination of harmless error a case involving unconstitutional presumptions regarding 
embezzlement and intent); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) (finding unconstitutional, and not 
harmless error, unlawful act and deadly weapon presumptions for malice). 
16. See, e.g. , Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970) (approving lower courts' 
determination of harmless error for Fourth Amendment violation in the seizure of evidence); United 
States v. Baro, 15 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding as harmless error the admission of 
unconstitutionally seized evidence). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Meza-Corrales, 183 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
error was harmless, even if it was a Miranda violation, given other incriminating evidence); Brecht 
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (holding use of post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes 
was harmless error under the lesser standard for habeas proceedings). 
18. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (listing cases in which structural error 
was found). 
19. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) . 
20. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (remanding for harmless error 
determination on an erroneous instruction on particular community's standard instead of "reasonable 
person" standard in obscenity case); Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 823 (1999) (remanding 
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A prejudicial effect on the proceedings is presumed with major league 
fouls. These fouls are not subjected to a harmless error analysis and 
result in an automatic reversal. The Court considers this type of error to 
be "structural" or to so infect the entire trial that harmless error analysis 
is meaningless. Thus, in the archetypal case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 22 
the denial of representation by counsel is viewed as an error that affects 
"[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end .... " 23 Because 
of such an error, "a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a 
vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence .... "24 
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 25 for example, the Court held that a 
harmless error standard was inapplicable to a defective instruction on the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Scalia pointed out that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial carries with it the right to have the jury find all elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the Due Process 
Clause. 26 Without a jury verdict on each of the elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the effect of the error was "unquantifiable and 
indeterminate," which qualified the error as structural. 27 The State 
fouled, the call was a jury right violation, and the penalty was reversal. 
No harmless error analysis applied. 
Minor league fouls result in the application of harmless error 
analysis. For example, in Arizona v. Fulminante/8 the Court assessed the 
extent to which the admitted coerced confession affected the verdict in the 
case.29 In one of the rare examples in which an error was found not to be 
harmless, the Court concluded that the coerced confession contributed to 
the verdict. There was little evidence other than two confessions, the first 
of which was coerced. The believability of the second confession was 
dependent upon knowledge of the first confession, and the admission of 
the coerced confession led to the admission of damaging evidence 
regarding connections to organized crime that would not otherwise have 
been admitted.30 In contrast, the erroneous admission of confessions by 
the co-defendants, who implicated the defendant in their statements, was 
for determination of whether harmless error analysis is appropriate for case in which the lower court 
failed to require a unanimous finding with regard to each of three narcotics violations in continuing 
criminal enterprise prosecution); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398 
(1999) (holding that the misdescription of the "official act" element of the illegal gratuity statute as 
"official position" was not harmless error). 
21. See, e.g., Neder, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
22. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
23. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 at 309-10 (1990). 
24. /d. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)). 
25. 508 u.s. 275 (1993). 
26. /d. at 277. 
27. /d. at 282. 
28. 499 u.s. 279 (1990). 
29. Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 297-300 (1990). 
30. /d. 
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viewed as harmless error in Harrington v. California. 31 Although the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine the co-defendants, which rendered 
the admission of their statements unconstitutional under Bruton, 32 the 
Court found that the evidence against Harrington was "overwhelming. "33 
Thus, although the minor league fouls are violations of the defendant's 
constitutional rights, the appellate courts may ultimately conclude that the 
errors are too insignificant to necessitate reversal. 
Because the categorization of the foul carries such a dramatic 
significance-reversal per se or harmless error analysis-it becomes 
critical to identify the characteristics of the major and minor league fouls. 
In Sullivan, Justice Scalia pointed out that it was not possible to assess the 
harm. Harmless error analysis requires a determination of the effect of 
the constitutional error on the "guilty verdict in the case at hand," not the 
effect on a reasonable, hypothetical jury. 34 Justice Scalia distinguished 
other situations, such as faulty presumptions, where harmless error 
analysis does apply. With faulty presumptions, he reasoned that the jury 
at least found the predicate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. If the 
presumed fact is inevitable from the predicate facts, then the defendant's 
right to a jury trial on each element is not jeopardized. 35 Moreover, using 
the Fulminante dichotomy between structural errors (no harmless error 
analysis applied) and trial errors (harmless error analysis applied), Justice 
Scalia easily concluded that the defective beyond a reasonable doubt 
instruction would be structural error that cannot be measured and cannot 
be harmless. 36 The "no harm, no foul" philosophy is, thus, inapplicable 
when there is no constitutionally_ obtained verdict to submit to a harmless 
error analysis. 
Aspiring fouls are subject to a harmless error analysis, but are clearly 
the most controversial calls . For example, in the 1987 case of Pope v. 
Illinois, 37 the trial court erroneously instructed the jury to decided 
whether allegedly obscene material had "literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value" on the basis of a state community standard rather than on 
the basis of a reasonable person standard, which would include value in 
31. 395 u.s. 250 (1969). 
32. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), held that a statement by a non-testifying co-
defendant that implicates the defendant, although properly admissible against that co-defendant, 
creates constitutional error in a trial in which the defendant and co-defendant are tried jointly. 
Despite a limiting instruction that the statement is admissible only against the co-defendant, the Court 
held there is too great a likelihood that a jury will fail to make that distinction in the situation in 
which the defendant is unable to cross-examine the co-defendant. /d. at 130. In that situation, either 
the references to the defendant must be excised, id. at 134 n.10, from the co-defendant's statement or 
the trials must be severed. Id. at 131-32. 
33. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 252-54 (1969). The Court focused on the 
evidence admitted against the defendant, including his own statements and the testimony of 
eyewitnesses . /d. 
34. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
35. !d. at 280-81. 
36. !d. at 280-82. 
37. 481 u.s. 497 (1987). 
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other commumttes. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a 
determination of harmless error-whether "no rational juror, if properly 
instructed, could find value in the magazines . . . . " 38 Although one 
might have expected Justice Scalia to dissent because there was no actual 
verdict on the reasonable person standard for value, he concurred on the 
basis that the state of Illinois's community was comparable to the 
reasonable person standard. 39 Four justices dissented, however, on the 
basis that harmless error analysis was inapplicable when the defendant 
was denied his right to a jury determination of an element of the crime.40 
The dissenters' reasoning is the same reasoning that continues to separate 
the Court in later cases, including Neder. 
The implications of California v. Roy, 41 decided in 1996, exemplify 
the continuing division of the Court over the propriety of harmless error 
analysis. In Roy, a unanimous Court reaffirmed that the harmless error 
standard on review of habeas proceedings is the less demanding 
Kotteakos-Brecht standard, not the Chapman standard. 42 The more 
significant conclusion in the case, however, involves the error made and 
the Court's response to it. Roy was accused of murder on an accomplice 
theory. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict, it had 
to find that Roy aided or abetted '"with knowledge of' the confederate's 
'unlawful purpose,'" but failed to instruct that Roy had to act with the 
'"knowledge [and] intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or 
facilitating' the confederate's crime. "43 Although the case was remanded 
for a determination under the less demanding harmless error standard for 
habeas cases,44 the per curiam opinion suggests that this "misdescription" 
error is a common, non-controversial trial error, to which harmless error 
analysis easily applies. 45 Concurring on the applicability of the 
Kotteakos-Brecht standard to habeas proceedings, Justice Scalia 
nevertheless pointed out that the failure to have a jury verdict on an 
element of the crime precludes the use of a harmless error analysis, 
unless the actual jury verdict on other elements necessarily meant that 
there was a jury finding on the intent. 46 The rivalry of the two opposing 
teams on the rationale for harmless error was clearly growing. 47 
38. ld. at 503-{)4. 
39. /d. at 504. 
40. /d. at 507-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41. 519 u.s. 2 (1996). 
42. /d. at 4-5. 
43. !d. at 3. 
44. See supra note 11 (setting forth the Brecht standard). Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 
750 (1946), was the case relied upon by the Court when it clarified in Brecht that the harmless error 
standard for habeas proceedings was a lesser burden than the harmless error standard on direct 
appeal. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 
45. Roy, 519 U.S. at 5. 
46. ld. at 6-8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the standard for harmless error on habeas 
review as the Brecht-O'Neal standard). O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), is another case 
involving a determination of harmless error in a habeas case. O'Neal clarified that a judge with a 
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B. The Harm 
As in sports , some constitutional fouls in criminal trials are 
automatically deemed to cause harm. An intentional face mask violation 
in football or a technical foul 48 in basketball merit immediate reprise. 
Similarly, major league constitutional fouls, such as denial of counsel, 
warrant an automatic reversal of a conviction. Undoubtedly because the 
consequence of an automatic reversal is so great, we see the Court stretch 
its reasoning, as discussed above, in order to assign fouls to the minor 
league camp. Thus, the vast majority of constitutional fouls do not 
warrant an automatic penalty. In fact, there is no penalty at all imposed 
for most fouls because the courts find no harm from the violation. We 
technically require the party who fouled (the State) to demonstrate the 
lack of harm. In reality, of course, the party fouled against (the 
defendant) does a full-court press to prove the harm. No one asks the 
fouled basketball player to demonstrate that he or she would have made 
the basket if not fouled. The defendant, on the other hand, combs the 
record to explain why the coerced confession or illegally seized evidence 
contributed to the verdict. 
Proving the harm is a difficult task. Failing to prove the harm is 
comparable to being stopped on the one-yard line in a close football 
game. The defense has moved the ball all the way down the field by 
proving the constitutional fouls, but in the end cannot win the game. 
Although the Court claims that it is not simply looking at the amount of 
properly admitted evidence and is, in fact, looking at the effect of the 
erroneously considered evidence, it is often difficult to see more than 
result-driven analysis . 
It is most apparent that the courts are simply result-driven in cases in 
which the erroneous evidence carries quite a punch, but the properly 
admitted evidence is abundant. The 5:4 split in Fulminante is a case in 
point. Confessions are considered powerful evidence in criminal trials. 
Therefore , an erroneously admitted coerced confession is likely to carry 
great weight-so much, in fact, that four justices thought that such error 
should be a major league foul with automatic harm assessed. 49 In the 
end, five justices found that, applying harmless error analysis, the 
"grave doubt" about the harmlessness of an error must conclude that the error is not harmless. /d. at 
436. 
47. For a discussion of cases and comments on the Court's approaches, see Benjamin E. 
Rosenberg, The Efjecr of Sullivan v. Louisiana on Harmless Error Analysis of Jury Instructions That 
Omit an Element of the Offense, 29 R UTGERS L. J . 315 (1998). 
48. I find it ironic that a "technical" foul in basketball is taken seriously while constitutional 
violations that are viewed as "technicalities" are scorned as inconsequential. 
49. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288-95 (1990) (White, J. , dissenting, joined by 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens). 
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coerced confession indeed contributed to the verdict. 50 It is striking that 
four justices would have found the coerced confession harmless error. 
Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the coerced 
confession was a "classic case of harmless error" because there was a 
second confession. 51 I~ contrast, Justice Kennedy, concurring to form a 
majority to reverse, wrote of the "indelible impact a full confession may 
have on the trier of fact . . . . "52 The proper issue is not how much other 
evidence there is of the defendant's guilt, but rather whether the 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence affected the verdict. Surely Justice 
Kennedy is correct in stating it is highly likely a confession will carry 
enormous weight in the jurors' minds. 
The same reasoning of the Fulminante dissenters, in easily finding 
error harmless, is apparent in most of the other harmless error cases. As 
noted in the last section, the Court in Harrington v. California 53 
concluded that the erroneous admission of two co-defendant confessions 
in violation of the Confrontation Clause was harmless in light of the 
"overwhelming" evidence that Harrington was guilty of a robbery and 
murder. 54 Similarly, in lower court cases, error is often found to be 
harmless through an analysis of the amount of evidence against the 
defendant. 55 Thus, the focus on the properly admitted evidence, rather 
than on the effect of the erroneous evidence, simply turns the harmless 
error test into one of the "right" result. 56 This interpretation of the 
Chapman standard exacerbates the effect of the "no harm, no foul" 
approach. The harm almost never exists and, thus, the foul is irrelevant. 
50. /d. at 297-302 (Opinion by White, J., joined by Justices Blackrnun, Marshall, Stevens, and 
Kennedy). 
51. /d. at 312. 
52. /d. at 313. 
53. 395 u.s. 250 (1969). 
54. /d. at 254. 
55. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 27 (documenting that the California Supreme 
Court found error harmless in 88/101 cases surveyed, including constitutional error); Harry T . 
Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 10 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1167, 1180-82 (1996) (discussing the increased use of harmless error in appellate 
decisions in general, although also commenting on a recent decline possibly due to construing the 
defendants' rights more narrowly which results in finding no error at all). 
56. For excellent discussions of the Court's shift from the effect of the erroneous ruling to the 
guilt of the defendant, see David McCord, Is Death "Different" for Purposes of Harmless Error 
Analysis? Should It Be?: An Assessment of United States and Louisiana Supreme Coun Case Low, 59 
LA. L. REv. 1105 (1999) (assessing the cases and the Coun's hybrid balancing approach); Charles S. 
Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 501 (1998) (proposing an "effect on the 
rights of the accused" test); Gregory Mitchell, Against "Overwhelming• Appellate Activism: 
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1335 (1994) (documenting the outcomes of 
cases using a "contributes" test, an "overwhelming" test, and a "weighing" test); Marla L. Mitchell, 
The Wizardry of Harmless Error: Brain, Hean, Courage Required When Reviewing Capital 
Sentences, 4 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (Fall 1994) (reviewing the "affect test" and the 
"overwhelming test") . 
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III. "No Harm, No Foul" as a Continuing Game Plan-Neder v. United 
States: A Bad Call 
The cases involving a failure to instruct on an element of the crime 
have elevated the "no harm, no foul" policy over reasoned analysis. 
Although there is no verdict on an element of the crime in violation of the 
defendant's constitutional rights, the Court applies a harmless error 
analysis. The Neder case is the Court's most troubling moment. A 
serious, fundamental foul is called, but there is no penalty. 
Mr. Neder was charged with various federal fraud crimes, tax fraud 
among them. The trial court failed to instruct the jury that they had to 
find materiality of false statements in the tax fraud case.57 In fairness to 
the trial judge, he believed that materiality was an issue for the court and 
decided it accordingly. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that 
materiality was a jury issue. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, reviewing Mr. Neder's conviction, found that the failure to 
instruct the jury on materiality was indeed error, but harmless. 58 The 
foul, as in Sullivan, was the violation of the defendant's right to a jury 
trial. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist did not hesitate to apply a 
"no harm, no foul" policy. Using both prior case law and equating a 
"fair" trial with a correct result, he easily did an end run around the lack 
of a jury verdict on an element of the crime. In the majority's view, a 
misdescribed element, a conclusory presumption, and an omitted element 
were all the same. 59 Because the Court had previously applied the 
harmless error doctrine to cases where there was no jury finding on an 
element because it was misdescribed or treated as a presumption, a 
fortiori a jury verdict on each element was not a prerequisite for harmless 
error analysis. The majority rejected the argument that the prior cases 
with harmless misdescribed or presumptive elements were limited to 
situations in which the jury had found the "functional equivalent" of those 
facts in the course of deciding the other elements.60 Instead, the majority 
wanted a brighter line for distinguishing structural versus trial errors. 
The Court distinguished the erroneous beyond a reasonable doubt 
instruction in Sullivan as an instance in which the error invalidated the 
57. Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 6 (1999). Neder also challenged the trial court's 
failure to instruct on materiality in the mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud charges. Unlike 
materiality with the tax fraud charge, the Eleventh Circuit held that materiality was not an element of 
the other fraud charges . /d. at 7. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that materiality was an 
element of the other fraud crimes, but remanded for a determination of harmless error since the 
Eleventh Circuit had not yet addressed it. /d. at 25 . On remand, the Eleventh Circuit found the 
failure to instruct harmless. United States v. Neder, 197 F .3d 1122, 1124 (11th Cir. 1999). 
58. Neder 527 U.S. at 6-7. 
59. /d. at 11-14. 
60. !d. at 13-14. 
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entire verdict. 61 Moreover, the Court viewed a fundamentally unfair trial 
as "an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. "62 A trial is 
not such an unreliable vehicle when there is "overwhelming" and 
"uncontroverted" evidence of the omitted element. 63 Justice Rehnquist 
made it quite clear that the absence of a jury verdict on an element does 
not in and of itself obviate the conviction. In the end, the Court expressly 
stated that it was balancing the defendant's right to a jury verdict on each 
element with a societal interest in convicting the guilty. 64 
Despite Justice Rehnquist's misguided version of harmless error, it is 
interesting that the majority states its holding narrowly. The Court fmds 
the error harmless in Neder with the following language: "In this 
situation, where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming 
evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the 
error, the instruction is properly found to be harmless. " 65 The Court 
pointed out that Neder argued at neither the trial level nor at the appellate 
level that his false statement was immaterial. The Court further identified 
uncontroverted evidence at trial that the false statements regarding $5 
million in income were material.66 The Court's carefully limited holding 
thus leaves open room for an argument that an erroneously omitted 
element of a crime would only be harmless if the element were 
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence. The opinion 
further allows for the position that contesting the element at trial or on 
appeal would be sufficient to establish the harm. 
In dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out the error of the majority's 
reasoning. He criticized the majority' s approach of analyzing whether the 
"right" result was reached, rather than how the result was derived. 67 As 
in Sullivan, Justice Scalia emphasized that the defendant has a 
constitutional right to a jury determination of each element of the crime. 
Regardless of the amount of the evidence in the record demonstrating the 
missing element, if there is no actual jury determination of that element, 
the trial is flawed and must be reversed. Otherwise, the appellate court 
abrogates the constitutional right to a jury decision on that element. 68 
Thus, the same principle applies here, when one element is omitted, as in 
Sullivan, when there was no jury decision beyond a reasonable doubt on 
any element of the crime. Just as the court cannot direct a guilty verdict 
against a defendant, neither can the court direct a verdict on any one 
element of the crime. Justice Scalia pointed out that the majority made a 
61. /d. at 10-11. 
62. !d. at 9. 
63. !d. at 17. 
64. /d. at 18. 
65. ld. at 17. 
66. /d. at 16. 
67. /d. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
68. /d. at 38-9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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specious distinction in stating that Sullivan was different because the 
entire verdict was defective, whereas only one element was missing here. 
He queried, then how many elements could be omitted?69 In other words, 
one could not distinguish omitting one element, four elements, or all 
elements. 70 In each case, there would be no jury verdict on that element, 
in violation of the Constitution. Justice Scalia found the other cases cited 
by the majority to be distinguishable. Either the jury necessarily found 
the missing element beyond a reasonable doubt in its findings on the other 
elements71 or on remand, harmless error should not be found. 72 
In the end, Justice Scalia chastised the Court for abusing the role of 
the appellate courts. Allowing an appellate court to decide guilt or 
innocence on an element of a crime "throws open the gate for appellate 
courts to trample over the jury's function. "73 In his analysis, consistent 
with his Sullivan opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that the failure to 
instruct on an element of the crime had to be structural error, which is 
automatically reversible. No amount of evidence could compensate for 
this procedural flaw, which invalidates the verdict by the jury on all 
elements. In this way, the flawed verdict is comparable to proceedings in 
which there is a verdict by an inadequate beyond a reasonable doubt 
instruction, a biased judge, or the absence of counsel. In each instance, 
the defendant is denied a right that casts the entire proceedings as 
fundamentally flawed. Although unheeded by the majority, Justice 
Scalia's analysis of the majority's "no harm, no foul" approach 
accurately identified the misconception of both the harm and the foul. 
IV. The Harm and the Foul of "No Harm, No Foul" Jurisprudence 
The irony of the catchy phrase "no harm, no foul" is that there is in 
fact a foul whether one is discussing sports or criminal trials. In sports 
69. ld. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
70. Recently, the Sixth Circuit was thoughtful enough, however, to distinguish Neder and find 
a per se reversible error when there was error in failing to instruct at all on a lesser included offense. 
See United States v. Monger, 185 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 1999). 
71. Justice Scalia indicates that this principle explains the Roy, Carella, and Pope decisions. 
Roy and Carella were remanded for a harmless error determination. Neder, 527 U.S. at 35-36 
(Scalia, J ., dissenting). Consistent with his Neder dissent, Justice Scalia's concurrences in those 
cases pointed out that there had to be a determination that the jury necessarily found the omitted 
element through its other findings before the error could be deemed harmless. See California v. Roy, 
519 U.S. 2, 6-8 (1996); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 267-273 (1989); Pope v. Illinois, 481 
u.s. 497, 504-05 (1987). 
72. Justice Scalia also distinguished Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), on the 
basis that Johnson had waived his right to raise the absence of an instruction on an element by failing 
to request such an instruction at trial. In this type of case, Justice Scalia would view that error under 
a "plain error" standard, which inhe1 ently contains an dt:ment of demonstrating an effect on the 
proceedings. Neder, 527 U.S . at 34-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also G. Fred Metos, Harmless 
Error, Plain Error and Standards of Review Revisited, 22 THE CHAMPION 45 (MAY 1998) (discussing 
Johnson and predicting the Court's decision in Neder). 
73. Neder, 527 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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terminology, it means that we are not going to call the foul because there 
is insufficient harm to the team that was fouled. 74 In contrast, in a 
criminal trial, the foul is called on appeal, but the finding of no harm 
renders the foul inconsequential. Despite the difference in calling the 
foul, the sports reference is a fitting analogy for criminal trials if one 
assumes that the "no harm" part of the analysis is that the prosecution 
would have won anyway. This final score approach, however, is at odds 
with the underlying logic of the harmless error analysis. 
The "no harm, no foul" approach seductively allows the court to look 
only at the amount of evidence the prosecution has stacked up against the 
defendant. As Justice Scalia has pointed out in case after case, the final 
score approach begs the question of how the game was played. And, in 
the case of a criminal trial, the Constitution is the rules book. The rules 
book requires that the defendant have a jury verdict on each element of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the cases involving a failure 
to instruct on an element, such as Neder, should be "textbook" examples 
of major league fouls. 
Moreover, the "no harm, no foul" philosophy obscures the 
significance of the foul. The foul is constitutional error. In cases like 
Neder, the failure to require a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
on all elements of the crime is an error that strikes at the heart of 
procedural fairness. It is not an insignificant play. Indeed, the foul is not 
contested; all referees (the Supreme Court justices) are in agreement that 
there is a foul. Just as in sports, however, if the court does not penalize 
the foul, for all practical purposes it did not occur. 75 Reminding 
ourselves that constitutional rights are in fact qualitatively different from 
fair play in a basketball game, it is unfortunate that the "no harm, no 
foul" approach lessens the importance of rights guaranteed to anyone 
facing a deprivation of liberty. 
74. Our common understanding of "no harm" as no harm to the advancement of the team 
fouled against may not have been the original intent of the framer of the phrase. According to the 
article on Chick-isms, supra note 4, the phrase meant that no foul was called despite significant 
physical contact with the offended player. This definition has nothing to do with the actual play in 
process. It implies that no foul was called because there was no permanent damage to the other 
player. Thus, the article refers to the phrase also as "no blood, no ambulance." By analogy, in a 
criminal proceeding, we would look at whether "blood" was drawn in the offensive contact with the 
defendant. This would put the focus on the blow to the defendant's rights rather than on the outcome 
of the trial. With that interpretation, one would surely find that "blood" was drawn in denying Neder 
a right to a jury verdict on an element of the crime. 
75. In fact, when I first began discussing "no harm, no foul" with my sports-fanatic friends, 
several thought there truly was no foul in the sport. Upon further reflection, they realized that indeed 
there was a foul (or one would not need the phrase), but it was insignificant in the game. The phrase 
speaks volumes in terms of the psychology, however, that there might as well not have been any foul 
because there is no consequence for it. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 432 ("[Harmless error 
doctrine] diminishes the level of protection provided by specific constitutional provisions . ... "); id. 
at 437 n.l45 (commenting that basketball changed into a "war zone" sport after the onset of a "no 
harm, no foul" approach); Edwards, supra note 55, at 1182 ("Courts sometimes openly decline to 
decide whether a defendant's rights have been violated, instead evading the issue by stating that any 
error that might have occurred was harmless ."). 
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The harm of "no harm, no foul" is also problematic. The harm is 
misapplied on two levels. First, the courts define harm correctly but 
apply it incorrectly. Using the Chapman language, the courts correctly 
ask: can the court conclude that beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict? However, the courts 
often apply a different test: was there enough evidence to convict the 
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt without the error? By relying upon 
the second question, the courts are able to find almost all error harmless . 
Second, the Court has asked the wrong question conceptually in the cases 
in which there is an incomplete verdict. Each level of misapplication 
deserves attention. 
The first level of misapplication, the dissonance between the 
definition and the application, can be demonstrated with an example. 
Suppose that there is a rape-murder prosecution in which the evidence 
admitted at trial includes: the defendant's DNA, found at the scene of the 
crime; his fingerprints, found everywhere at the scene; the fact that he 
was the victim's estranged husband and jealous of her relationship with 
another man; the fact he had threatened her; and his confession to the 
crime. Now assume that, on appeal, the confession is found to be 
unconstitutionally coerced. If the question is whether there is enough 
evidence without the confession to conclude that the jury would have 
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the answer is 
probably yes. If, however, the question is whether the erroneously 
admitted confession contributed to the verdict in a significant way, it is 
much more difficult to conclude that the error was harmless. The 
confession was probably a highly important piece of evidence to the jury, 
as the defendant's own words. In that case, the confession most certainly 
"contributed" to the verdict, even though there is a significant amount of 
properly admitted evidence. The Chapman standard recognizes that the 
defendant, guilty or innocent, is entitled to the procedural fairness of a 
verdict that is not affected by the erroneous evidence. 76 The perversion 
of the Chapman standard into an overwhelming evidence test has pushed 
harmless error analysis to a final score approach to the fairness of 
criminal trials. Even if such an approach is appropriate in sports, it is 
inconsistent with the concept of providing every accused, even the 
76. A good example of the Coun applying the Chapman standard in ierms of the effect on the 
verdict, rather than focusing on the sufficiency of the evidence, occurred in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 
U.S. 249 (1988) . In Satterwhite, the Court held that the admission of a psychiatrist's testimony in the 
penalty phase of a capital case, in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, was 
not harmless. The Court noted: "The question, however, is not whether the legally admitted 
evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether 
the State has proved • beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained. ' " /d. at 258-59. For a funher critique of the use of harmless error analysis in the 
penalty phase of capital cases, see McCord, supra note 56; Linda E. Caner, Harmless Error in the 
Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REv. 125 
(1993). 
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guiltiest, with fundamentally fair proceedings. 77 Our criminal justice 
system is based on treating the accused with dignity, which in turn 
promotes respect for the system and its results. The final score approach 
to the harmless error doctrine drastically undermines the procedural 
fairness of a criminal trial by rendering virtually all error harmless and 
irrelevant. 78 
The second level of misapplication occurs when the wrong question is 
asked. The wrong question is posed in those cases in which the error 
results in an incomplete verdict. As Justice Scalia has asserted, it is 
illogical to attempt to assess the effect of an error on a verdict when there 
is only a fictional verdict. 79 This is not even instant replay material; the 
play never happened. The "no harm, no foul" approach applied in these 
cases does more than distort the fundamental fairness of the trial-it 
completely disintegrates the proceeding. There is no proceeding to be 
replayed and reviewed for the effect of the error . Whether there is a 
failure to instruct on an element of a crime or a misdescription of an 
element, the critical question is whether or not the jury actually found the 
existence of the element beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury did not 
address the facts in question under the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, even if evidence of the missing facts was presented at trial, 
there is no actual verdict on the element as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. If an appellate court steps in to review such an incomplete 
verdict under harmless error analysis, the appellate court is acting as a 
fact-finder. 80 The division between the trial court as fact-finder and the 
appellate court as reviewer of questions of law is a fundamental precept in 
our system. Any inroad on these basic roles invades the balance between 
these two levels of the court system. Moreover, the defendant is 
77. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 5, at 88-91, 127 (suggesting that there are "truth-
impairing" and "truth-neutral" rights; the latter should not be dependent on the "correct result"). 
78. See Chapel , supra note 56, at 540 ("[A]ppellate courts . .. routinely deem harmless lower 
court actions of breaking rules in order to affirm convictions and sentences of those caught breaking 
rules."). 
79. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993). 
80. An example of the logical, but unfortunate, extension of Neder to even more extensive 
appellate fact-finding occurred in United States v. Jackson , 196 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 1999), cen. 
denied, Jackson v. United States 530 U.S. 267 (2000), in which the Second Circuit found harmless 
error even though the defendant contested the missing element. In the criminal extortion prosecution 
of the woman who claimed to be Bill Cosby's daughter, the trial court failed to instruct that a "threat 
to reputation" must be "wrongful." /d. at 387. The threat is wrongful if "the defendant has no 
plausible claim of right to the money demanded or if there is no nexus between the threat and the 
defendant's claim. " /d. Although finding error in the failure to instruct on the element of 
" wrongful, " the court found that the jury would have convicted even if they had considered the 
evidence the defendant did introduce relevant to this point and the evidence that she would have 
offered on this eleme nt if permitted to do so. /d. at 388. In essence, the Second Circuit granted a 
directed verdict on this element to the government, finding the facts insufficient. For an excellent 
discussion of this case, see Kathryn Keneally, White-Collar Crime: More Harm Done by the 
Harmless Error Rule, 24 THE CHAMPION 49 (Jan./Feb. 2000). See also United Stat<.-s v. Gracidas-
Ulibarry, 231 F .3d 1188,1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding failure to instruct on specific intent element 
harmless where defendant contested the element but, according to the court, had insufficient evidence 
to support the defense). 
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guaranteed by the Constitution that a jury, if he or she so wishes, will 
decide the issue of guilt or innocence. As Justice Scalia has repeatedly 
pointed out to the Court (usually, unfortunately, to no avail), the framers 
of the Constitution valued the right to a jury trial as one of the most basic 
guarantees. 81 The ease of the "no harm, no foul" approach has blinded 
the Court to the importance of conceptual clarity and the protection of 
constitutional rights. 
V. Conclusion 
Quick and easy phrases are vulnerable to misconceptions. For 
starters, one must understand the reference in order to get the point. If 
one does not watch football, for example, then an "end run" around an 
issue will not convey the point that the court avoided handling the issue 
directly. Even a "slam dunk" requires an understanding that it is a solid, 
easy basket in order to transfer the meaning to a legal issue that is clear-
cut.82 "No harm, no foul" as a description of harmless error is catchy, 
but obscures the underlying concepts. Like the sports term, the legal 
phrase harmless error has become a catch phrase for the Court. And, as 
with other quick references, the Court is no longer fully evaluating the 
meaning and purpose of harmless error analysis. Neder exemplifies the 
misguided transformation of harmless error analysis into a "no harm, no 
foul" approach, both in terms of jurisprudential philosophy and erroneous 
application. 
The Neder decision, and the Court's overall approach to harmless 
error analysis, fail to appreciate the underlying concepts. The catch 
phrase "no harm, no foul" is apt in a literal sense to the Court's 
decisions, as well as in exemplifying a lack of analysis. The decision in 
Neder is probably a "no harm, no foul" situation in terms of Neder's 
actual guilt. It is hard to argue that a $5 million error is not material on a 
tax return. The problem is that the "harm" is not the guilt or innocence 
of Neder. The harm is whether or not Neder received a fundamentally 
fair trial. A fundamentally fair trial includes the right to a jury verdict on 
all elements of the crime. Neder did not have such a verdict. The 
harmless error doctrine should ask if the error contributed to the verdict. 
In Neder's case, the answer is that there is no verdict on the element. 
Therefore, the question is pointless because the predicate of a verdict is 
missing. 
81. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30-32 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
82. Over the years, I have found that international students are at the most disadvantage with 
sports references. I have explained "slam dunk," for example, to foreign students. Of course, other 
culturally bound references can also be confusing. I referred to an issue as a "red herring" one day 
in class and was asked about it by two foreign students afterwards. I explained the concept, but could 
not answer their question about the source of the phrase. Thinking that I should know the answer, I 
searched until I found the source. If you feel the need to know the source and cannot find it, call me 
and I will tell you what I found. In the sporting event of law school , this is called "hiding the ball. " 
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The Supreme Court must be careful that it does not approach trials as 
one would referee a sports event. Although there are some similarities 
between winning a game and prevailing at trial, the harmless error 
analysis was not intended to focus only on the final score of guilt or 
innocence. The role of the appellate courts is to assess whether the error 
contributed to the verdict, not whether they agree with the verdict based 
on the evidence in the record. A shift to whether the result was correct 
infringes on the defendant's right to a jury verdict in any case, but is 
especially apparent if there is no jury verdict on an element of the crime. 
In a case such as Neder, the Court has ignored the principled approach 
required by the Constitution and abridged Neder's right to a jury trial. 
"No harm, no foul" may accurately describe the Court' s approach, but 
there is in fact both a harm and a foul that deserve a correct call. The 
"no harm, no foul" approach deserves rethinking and revision. The 
constitutional fouls are significant and the harm should be analyzed m 
terms of the fundamental procedural rights of the defendant. 
